During the early part of her operational history, Sydney helped enforce sanctions during the Abyssinian Crisis, and at the start of World War II was assigned to convoy escort and patrol duties in Australian waters. In May 1940, Sydney joined the British Mediterranean Fleet for an eight-month deployment, during which she sank two Italian warships, participated in multiple shore bombardments, and provided support to the Malta Convoys, while receiving minimal damage and no casualties. On her return to Australia in February 1941, Sydney resumed convoy escort and patrol duties in home waters.
On 19 November 1941, Sydney was involved in a mutually destructive engagement with the German auxiliary cruiser Kormoran, and was lost with all hands (645 aboard). The wrecks of both ships were lost until 2008; Sydney was found on 17 March, five days after her adversary. Sydney‘s defeat is commonly attributed to the proximity of the two ships during the engagement, and Kormoran‘s advantages of surprise and rapid, accurate fire. However, the cruiser’s loss with all hands compared to the survival of most of the Germans has resulted in conspiracy theories alleging that the German commander used illegal ruses to lure Sydney into range, that a Japanese submarine was involved, and that the true events of the battle are concealed behind a wide-ranging cover-up, despite the lack of evidence for these allegations.
HMAS Sydney
Page 1
HMAS Sydney seen in 1936.
HMAS Sydney seen in 1938.
HMAS Sydney seen passing under the Harbour Bridge, Sydney, NSW, Australia, date unknown.
(Photo from the collection of W/O Henry T. G. Hunt, R.A.A.F.) Courtesy of Sandy and Les Cridland
HMAS Sydney seen in Sydney Harbour, date unknown.
(Photo from the collection of W/O Henry T. G. Hunt, R.A.A.F.) Courtesy of Sandy and Les Cridland
This is HMNZS Te Mana, one of two Anzac-class frigates in the RNZN. How to replace them is a key component of the future fleet structure. (Gordon Arthur)
The Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) commenced an industry engagement exercise with the release of a request for information (RfI) on 8 September. The document, entitled Maritime Fleet Market Research for the Defence Capability Plan, revolves around how the navy can better manage its fleet with limited dollars.
All except one ship in the New Zealand fleet – which comprises two frigates, two offshore patrol vessels (OPV), two inshore patrol vessels, a multirole vessel, replenishment vessel and hydrographic/diving vessel that cumulatively require a core crew of 647 personnel – are up for replacement by the mid-2030s.
The RFI acknowledged: “The current fleet configuration of nine ships across six classes, with many aspects of bespoke design, is increasingly difficult for the Royal New Zealand Navy to manage. Maintenance, operational management and training requirements differ significantly between ship classes.”
Having only one or two vessels in each class may provide breadth of capability, but little depth. That means the ideal vessel may not always be available when needed. With this in mind, the navy is thus considering alternative ways of operating.
Specifically, the RFI seeks to gather information on the following: fleet configuration options; alternative crewing, operating and support concepts; new technologies; consideration of approaches to reduce environmental impact; increased partnering arrangements with industry; and reducing the complexity of New Zealand Defence Force systems and structures.
HMNZS Canterbury is the RNZN’s solitary multirole vessel, but the design’s commercial origins mean it has not been a perfect amphibious solution. (Credit: Gordon Arthur)
The scope encompasses naval ships, landing craft, unmanned systems, mission planning and simulation/training facilities, but it does not extend to naval helicopters or ship boats.
The RFI’s target audience is companies who offer maritime consultation services; maritime through-life providers; manufacturers of ships, uncrewed systems, mission planning and training solutions; and maritime commercial crew services.
Market research data gleaned from this RFI exercise will inform a Defence Capability Plan due in 2024. The last plan was issued in 2019, and the Royal New Zealand Navy does not simply want like-for-like vessel replacements.
Currently, there are 2,219 Royal New Zealand Navy personnel and a single base at Davenport in Auckland, but the force is suffering badly from retention and recruitment issues. Thus, workforce optimisation is a priority. This might entail crew rotation models, using civilians in specialist roles aboard or ashore, mission planning support ashore or advanced training and simulation for capability generation.
Dr. Peter Greener of the Centre for Defence Studies at Victoria University in Wellington, noted that personnel numbers in July 2023 were almost exactly the same as in July 2020.
“However, what these numbers don’t reflect is the loss of experienced, qualified tradespeople. The RNZN attrition rate has stood around 12%, but it’s the loss of skilled engineers and the like which led to three ships being tied up from late 2022…”Dr. Peter Greener, Centre for Defence Studies at Victoria University
The three vessels tied up are the OPVs HMNZS Wellington and Otago, and the inshore patrol vessel HMNZS Hawea. Dr. Greener further informed Naval News that “retention does seem to be improving since the announcement of significant pay increases”.
The RNZN is being forced into creativity. This may involve reducing ship classes, achieving greater concurrency across platforms, adding unmanned technologies, reducing complexity and bespoke solutions, or reaching new partnership solutions with industry.
Perhaps the most important consideration is how to replace two Anzac-class frigates. Certainly, looming block obsolescence gives the RNZN huge opportunities to redesign its fleet. It is therefore commendable that the navy is developing new options to inform government investment out till 2040.
Is vessel modularity the answer?
The Cube concept from SH Defence in Denmark envisages more than 300 different modular payloads that can be added, removed and exchanged aboard vessels. (SH Defence)
Even though modularity is increasingly popular, no single platform yet fully encapsulates the concept. Nonetheless, Dr. Greener highlighted the applicability of the Cube modular payload concept unveiled by Danish company SH Defence in 2020. This containerised system is not tied to a ship’s fixed superstructure, plus it encompasses the infrastructure to handle modules ashore and on board the vessel.
Incidentally, Denmark introduced the original Standard Flex (StanFlex) modularity concept some three decades ago, and first adopted on Flyvefisken-class corvettes. In fact, the driver for the Royal Danish Navy was very similar to New Zealand’s – the need to replace 22 warships in three classes with a reduced number of vessels.
Modularity is alluring, as standard hulls with spaces for self-contained mission modules can be swapped out and easily upgraded over time. It also shifts more of the maintenance and training burden ashore, and helps alleviate obsolescence management. For example, maritime strike modules could add missiles and sensors to a ship, while a swappable maritime interdiction module might be used for regular sea patrols.
However, there are limits. Modularity seeks acceptable performance over a wide range of requirements, rather than optimal design for specific requirements. This leads to compromises. The lower cost of modular payloads may be seductive, but it can result in vessels with suboptimal performance for their intended roles. In other words, a ship can become a jack of all trades, but master of none.
For instance, the USN’s Littoral Combat Ship envisaged three variants – antisubmarine warfare, mine countermeasures and surface warfare. Ultimately, the USN abandoned the idea of swappable modules, plus the mission types often conflicted with the basic design parameters of the LCS.
Because affordability is critical to New Zealand, it cannot start from scratch creating modularity. This could give rise to cooperation with like-minded allies such as Australia or the UK, with the latter’s Type 32 frigate programme exploring modular payloads.
The RFI discussed unmanned technologies too, and Dr. Greener pointed out that the Royal New Zealand Navy is already putting such systems to good use, one example being the Remus 100.
“The RFI suggests that autonomous or remotely operated uncrewed air, surface and sub-surface vehicles may be operated from ships, but would initially be seen as complements to a ship’s capability. This leaves a wide range of options open.”
HMS Triumph – converted from a Carrier to a repair ship
HMS Triumph was a Royal Navy Colossus-class light fleet aircraft carrier. She served in the Korean War and later, after reconstruction, as a support ship.https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Triumph_(R16)
(Submarine # 2) Underway off the New York Navy Yard, Brooklyn, N.Y., circa 1909. Note the coal-handling facility in the center background. U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command Photograph.Plunger (SS2), renamed A1. Port bow, moored beside the Shark (SS8), 1902
She is not to be confused with the experimental submarine Plunger which was evaluated by the U.S. Navy from 1898 to 1900, but not accepted or commissioned.
Assigned to the Naval Torpedo Station at Newport, Rhode Island for experimental torpedo work, Plunger operated locally from that facility for the next two years, a period of time broken only by an overhaul at the Holland yard at New Suffolk from March to November 1904. Besides testing machinery, armament and tactics, the submarine torpedo boat also served as a training ship for the crews of new submersibles emerging from the builder’s yards.
In August 1905, Plunger underwent two weeks of upkeep before leaving the yard on 22 August. She was towed by the tugApache to New York City, where Plunger conducted trials near the home of President Theodore Roosevelt. Upon the submarine’s arrival that afternoon, she moored alongside the tug and prepared for a visit from President Roosevelt.
The unmanned surface vessel Sea Hunter transits underneath the Sydney Harbor bridge as part of a scheduled port visit. Photo: US Navy/Ensign Pierson Hawkins.
Several unmanned surface vessels – Ranger, Mariner, Seahawk, and Sea Hunter – made their way to Sydney ahead of bilateral exercises with the Royal Australian Navy.
USVs Ranger, Mariner, Seahawk, and Sea Hunter from Unmanned Surface Vessel Division One (USVDIV-1) arrived in Australia and travelled underneath the Sydney Harbour Bridge for a scheduled port visit on 24 October.
It’s understood an ongoing Pacific Fleet exercise will test, develop, and evaluate the integration of unmanned platforms into fleet operations to create warfighting advantages.
During the exercises, USVDIV-1 will collaborate with the RAN on testing unmanned systems in concert with industry partners to advance a shared understanding of these capabilities to meet strategic requirements.
“I look forward to furthering the strong relationship our navies have worked hard to create,” according to US Navy Commander Jeremiah Daley, commanding officer of USVDIV-1.
“Our shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific relies upon developing these advanced capabilities that will create the asymmetric warfighting advantages to deter aggression in contested environments.”
The Independence-variant littoral combat ship USS Oakland has also arrived in Sydney alongside the USVs and all five US Navy vessels are being employed in the ongoing US Pacific Fleet exercise Integrated Battle Problem 23.2.
It’s hoped the exercise will develop concepts of operations for future unmanned programs of record and further integrated USVs into routine operations alongside manned surface combatants.
“In order to develop a program as different and disruptive as small, medium, and large USVs, integrating with allies and partners early and consistently in its development is key to our success,” said CDR Daley.
“Through exercises like IBP 23.2 and Autonomous Warrior, we continue to learn from experience in an operational theatre and deepen our interoperable strength.”
USVDIV-1’s mission is to test, evaluate, and operate in support of integrating USVs into fleet operations and provide recommendations to Navy leadership on the development of unmanned systems.
It’s understood the USV vessels are manned while conducting harbour operations, however, they are 100 per cent autonomous with no crew aboard at sea under normal operation.
The US 7th Fleet is the US Navy’s largest forward-deployed numbered fleet and routinely interacts and operates with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific to preserve a free and open Indo-Pacific region.
The Australian Defence Force has previously partnered with defence industry companies in the development of autonomous vehicles, including autonomous underwater vehicles for the Royal Australian Navy.
The U.S. Navy heavy cruiser USS Saint Paul (CA-73) off Wonsan, Korea, with guns ready for bombardment, 20 April 1951.
Photo #: 80-G-440021 USS Buck (DD-761), USS Wisconsin (BB-64) and USS Saint Paul (CA-73) Steaming in close formation during operations off the Korean coast. Photo is dated 22 February 1952. Official U.S. Navy Photograph, now in the collections of the National Archives.
Her keel was laid down as Rochester on 3 February 1943 by the Bethlehem Steel Company in Quincy, Massachusetts. She was launched on 16 September 1944 sponsored by Mrs. Marie Gordon McDonough,[1] wife of John J. McDonough, then mayor of Saint Paul; and commissioned on 17 February 1945, Captain Ernest H. von Heimburg in command. She was struck from the Naval Vessel Register on 31 July 1978, and was sold for scrapping in January 1980. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Saint_Paul_(CA-73)
With a 100-bed medical complex on board, she acts as a floating medical facility during times of crisis or war. https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/our-organisation/the-fighting-arms/royal-fleet-auxiliary/casualty-ship/rfa-argus
Captain Martin Clemens (rear centre), a coastwatcher on Guadalcanal, provided intelligence to Allied forces during the battle for the island (August 1942 – February 1943).
After Imperial Japan formally kicked off World War II in the Pacific by attacking the U.S. Navy fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, in December 1941, Japanese forces made lightning-fast advances in the South Pacific. By early 1942, Japan had occupied all of southeast Asia, threatening India in the west, Australia in the south, and Hawaii in the east.
Surging from former Imperial German island colonies in the central Pacific that Japan had acquired at the end of World War I, they quickly overran island archipelagos, such as the Admiralties and the Solomons in the far South Pacific, close to Australia. These remote islands often had plantations owned by individuals and corporations and administered by Australian, New Zealand, and British nationals.
While the Japanese conquest was rapid, it had been long anticipated by Australian, New Zealand and British military intelligence agencies. As far back as the 1920s and 1930s, plantation owners and managers on these remote islands were actively recruited, trained, and supplied with radios and other equipment by Australian military intelligence. When the war broke out, these civilian volunteers became the Coastwatchers. The force grew to over six hundred personnel serving behind the Japanese lines.
Formally known by names such as the Coast Watch Organisation, Combined Field Intelligence Service or Section C, Allied Intelligence Bureau, they began to observe and report enemy movements and rescue nationals from Allied nations stranded by the Japanese onslaught. The work was dangerous, and in addition to working behind Japanese lines with extremely limited resources and supplies, they had to contend with life-threatening tropical diseases. Many civilian Coastwatchers were rugged, independent types who had good relations with and the trust of local Indigenous island peoples. Some of the islands had Indigenous police, constabulary, and paramilitary organizations in place before the war. When the Imperial Japanese demonstrated their typical contempt for conquered peoples and implemented heavy-handed control over the Indigenous populations, the Coastwatchers soon had many ready recruits.
With radar in its infancy, and given the vast distances involved, the Coastwatchers and their Indigenous allies became indispensable in providing early warning of Imperial Japanese aircraft and ships headed out to attack the Allies in various island campaigns, such as Guadalcanal. U.S. Admiral William Halsey Jr., the acerbic commander of Naval forces during the Solomon Islands campaign, gave high praise to the Coastwatchers: “The Coastwatchers saved Guadalcanal, and Guadalcanal saved the South Pacific.”
Many downed Allied fliers and shipwrecked sailors were also rescued by Indigenous people working with coastwatcher organizations, who sometimes had to barter for these airmen with neutral tribes who had not yet encountered the Japanese. When future U.S. president John F. Kennedy’s patrol boat, PT 109, was destroyed in action against the Japanese Navy in the waters around Guadalcanal, Kennedy, and the surviving members of his crew were rescued through the efforts of an Australian coastwatcher. In July 2022, Australian Coastwatchers James Burrowes and Ronald George Lee were still living and were honored in a wreath-laying ceremony by U.S. Ambassador to Australia Caroline Kennedy, daughter of President Kennedy, at the Australian War Memorial in the capital city of Canberra.
Solomon Islander scouts display Japanese weapons and flags captured during Carlson’s patrol.
“The event was a very special and personal acknowledgment by Ambassador Kennedy and the US government of the role we had as Aussie Coastwatchers eight decades ago. I am proud at 98 to meet Her Excellency and share Coastwatcher stories. The time I spent in the Solomons and other locations as a Coastwatcher is as vivid today as it was then. It has been an honor to participate in this memorial event,” Australian World War II veteran Mr. Ronald (Dixie) George Lee said.
As the war in the South Pacific progressed, the traditional role of coast watching organizations to observe, and report expanded to the even more dangerous work of reconnoitering potential landing beaches as the Allies began their strategic island-hopping campaign towards the home islands of Japan. Forehand knowledge of the reefs, tides, and shore conditions of remote, Japanese-held islands was critical to successful amphibious assaults. Although many Coastwatchers were formally commissioned as officers in the Australian Naval Reserves, for their protection in case of capture, this was disregarded by the Japanese. In 1942, 17 New Zealand Coastwatchers were captured in the Gilbert Islands and were executed by the Japanese in October 1942 following an American air raid, part of the preparation for the attack on Tarawa by the U.S. Marines.
Although they rarely engaged in open combat, the Coast Watchers performed missions, such as beach reconnaissance and organizing local forces in occupied territory, that would later come under unconventional warfare units such as the U.S. Navy SEALS, the British Special Air Service, and U.S. Special Forces.
