(Main image: HMS Anson heading up the Clyde, Autumn 2023. Photo: Shelia Weir)
As part of the House of Commons Defence Select Committee enquiry into armed forces readiness, the First Sea Lord, Admiral Ben Key gave some insight into the current availability levels of the RN fleet. Here we consider the discussion and some of the nuances and context that were overlooked.
Fight tonight
It was asked of the First Sea Lord how many frigates and destroyers could put to sea if called on to “fight tonight”. He was understandably reluctant to be pinned down on exact numbers but stated that “we maintain about 50 per cent of the fleet at high readiness and above” and when pushed, said that there were typically about “eight and a half or nine” escorts at readiness or at sea. It is important to see availability as a constant cycle as ships move through maintenance, training and deployment phases. This cycle is dependent on a long tail of force generation planning to get the vessel to the right material state, provide SQEP (people) along with the spares, stores and equipment needed to make an effective fighting unit. In an emergency greater numbers could be deployed but only with significant consequences in terms of availability in the future. The smaller the fleet becomes, the more acute the effects of any interruption to this cycle.
At the time of this committee hearing, surface combatant availability as a proportion is looking unusually healthy with 9 or 10 of the 17 in commission either at sea or at a high state of readiness. Of course, this peak number can be expected to dip as ships cycle back from deployment. For example, both HMS Dauntless and Duncan have been away for some time and will inevitably need maintenance periods before any of the 3 Type 45s in deep refit are ready to replace them.
Self-congratulation should be avoided as almost everyone agrees that 17 escorts (16 in reality) is woefully inadequate and it was not long ago that Boris Johnson’s government was talking about increasing numbers to 24. While the RN always insists it can meet its mandated tasking under the (classified) Defence Planning Assumptions, there is clearly little depth or resilience to cope with the unexpected or combat losses.
The frigate gap
Asked what the First Sea Lord would like to have in an ideal world, the Admiral replied, “What I’d really like is to accelerate the pace of transformation from the ships and submarines we have in build to the new navy…” He compared this new generation of ‘digital ships’ that replace existing ‘analogue vessels’ as being similar to when the RN changed from sail to steam propulsion. This may be rather over-selling the difference between a Type 23 and Type 26/31 but the more important point is that the new ships will have much better availability and greater flexibility for different roles.
Mark Francois MP pointed out that the first Type 26 frigate, HMS Glasgow will have taken 11 years from keel laying to becoming operational in late 2028 which compares very poorly with other navies such as the Japanese. It was implied this delay was all the fault of industry but in fact, the story is rather more complex. The Navy spent almost 30 years deciding what would replace the Type 23 in a convoluted process of changing requirements and a few blind alleys. Years of austerity, the costs of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and aircraft carrier construction, helped push the project further to the right. By the time the Type 26 design was mature enough to begin construction, its price had ballooned and the MoD then spent at least two years in a standoff negotiating on price. The eventual compromise was a slow build schedule agreed by all parties which would spread the cost, keeping in-year payments down, although increasing the total bill. Unfortunately, COVID and production problems added another 18 months of delay.
Putting aside the issues with the first-of-class prototype, HMS Glasgow, 1SL pointed out that of more importance is that the rest of the Type 26s are delivered quicker and in a steady drumbeat, on time and without significant teething troubles. It should be noted that the 5 Batch II vessels will be delivered faster than the first 3 ships. Other than HMS Glasgow the expected In-Service Dates for the Type 26 frigates are not public. (Assuming Babcock can deliver on their promises, the Type 31 in-service schedule is more definite). Dates for the retirement of the Type 23 frigates are also fluid and will depend on their material state. It is doubtful the RN itself can even be sure what its frigate fleet will look like between about 2028-35. The ‘frigate gap’ in this period where the ageing Type 23s have to be kept going awaiting replacement by new ships is undoubtedly the RN’s most pressing medium-term worry.
Following our article published in May highlighting the state of HMS Westminster, the committee pressed 1SL and Rear Admiral Moorhouse on her future. They continue to insist she has not been axed and that a refit might still happen, subject to “ongoing work to understand what would be involved”. The refit would cost at least £100M and might take 3-4 years. It starts to look like wasted money if she can only serve for a few more years from around 2027-32. Transferring her S2087 Towed Array Sonar system to HMS Iron Duke or Argyll (not a simple operation) in the interim might have to be considered. HMS Westminster is highly unlikely to return to the fleet, even if it will entail a further dip in frigate numbers into the early 2030s. A cynic might suggest the RN has been told to stall on the announcement until after the election, by which time it will land on another minister’s in-tray.
Think the unthinkable
Based on our recent article highlighting the concerns about increasingly long deterrent submarine patrols, Sarah Atherton MP asked what can be done to improve matters, especially for submariners. 1SL admitted, “What keeps me awake at night is the pressure on our deployed personnel”. A ‘Tiger Team’ is currently tasked to “think the unthinkable” and look at completely new ways about how submarines are deployed and operated in order to relieve pressure on people.
Mr Francois also quoted our article from late August that noted not a single RN attack submarine was at sea on a particular day, something he described rather unfairly as “operational failure”. 1SL rightly pointed out that this was the best situation for the boats at the time, given their schedules and that maybe they did not actually need to be at sea on that particular day. This is a nuanced argument and 1SL is right to say that submarines are not put to sea for the sake of it and it would be pointlessly disruptive to the operating cycle to do so. (Within a few days, two boats did sail from Faslane as we predicted). When pressed, he suggested that half the force (3 boats) could be put to sea in extremis. He also reminded the committee more broadly that “days at sea” numbers are not a good measurement of fleet effectiveness or actual availability.
However, the episode highlights how a 6-boat force is far too small and 2 of those precious submarines are effectively stuck alongside for an extended period due to maintenance and support infrastructure issues. To say they were “not needed at sea on that day” may be true in a narrow tactical sense but certainly not in the wider strategic sense. It will always be desirable to have one or more boats on operations as they are arguably our most potent naval assets and create great uncertainty in the minds of adversaries. They are also needed to gather intelligence, respond to events, and would be very useful in the Pacific and other theatres if only we had sufficient numbers.
Rounding off
Mr Francois also cited another of our pieces on recruitment issues but the discussion focussed purely on the long term and the pros and cons of the tri-service privatised Armed Forces Recruitment Programme (AFRP). An important opportunity was missed to press the Admiral on the low numbers of candidates making it into basic training right now and what is being done to address this very real crisis. Everyone recognises that in the long term militaries around the world will struggle to find recruits for a variety of demographic and societal factors, however, the RN does not have an attraction problem at present. According to the MoD’s own figures, at least 80 people apply to join the RN every single day but failures in the processing pipeline mean many suitable candidates don’t make it to HMS Raleigh.
On the sustainment of the fleet in theatre, the witnesses pointed out that the RN can be positive about the progress with the Type 45 PIP programme and the success of forward-deploying a frigate, MCMVs in the Gulf and the Batch II OPVs overseas. The RN was one of the few navies that was able to send a carrier strike group across the globe during COVID with very little host nation support.
Finally, it should be noted that Ben Key and Steve Moorhouse are generally well-liked and respected in the service and are grappling hard with an array of legacy problems, few of which are of their making. They are obviously constrained by what they can say in the committee but mostly endeavoured to be honest and avoid the spin and obscurification that is sometimes the refuge of other uniformed and MoD witnesses.
(Main image: HMS Anson heading up the Clyde, Autumn 2023. Photo: Shelia Weir)
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