The Philippine Navy guided-missile frigate BRP Antonio Luna participates in a joint maritime exercise with Royal Australian Navy ships, April 2025.US Indo-Pacific Command
The Philippines signed a status of visiting forces agreement with New Zealand last month, regulating the deployment of troops for joint military exercises.
The agreement marks a significant milestone after New Zealand joined the Philippines and other countries in 2024 for multilateral maritime drills in the South China Sea.
The deal aligns with New Zealand’s support for freedom of navigation and overflight on the high seas. For the Philippines, it adds to its widening network of security partners.
This latest deal with New Zealand adds to the Philippines’ wide network of security partners. It is the fourth such deal by the Philippines to allow foreign troops to operate in the country, adding to the 2024 reciprocal access agreement with Japan, 2012 status of visiting forces agreement with Australia, and the 1999 visiting forces agreement with the United States
The three existing agreements with these countries are also part of the so-called “squad”, a minilateral grouping that seeks to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific region. The Philippines is expected to sign a similar agreement with Canada by mid-2025, while France has also proposed a deal.
Its expanding bilateral security cooperation further reinforces what the Lowy Institute’s 2024 Asia Power Index regards as the Philippines’ strongest advantage.
The Philippines has relied on defence cooperation to enhance capabilities, demonstrate resolve, and serve as force multipliers to deter Chinese threats.
These agreements are important for the Philippines given China’s consistent maritime threats, the latest being the unfurling of a Chinese flag on Sandy Cay in the South China Sea.
Long outgunned and outspent by China, the Philippines cannot match Chinese maritime capabilities despite its long-term commitment to upgrade its forces. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has offered only limited diplomatic support to the Philippines, and the United States alliance is regarded as uncertain under its new administration.
So, the Philippines has relied on defence cooperation to enhance capabilities, demonstrate resolve, and serve as force multipliers to deter Chinese threats. China routinely condemns what it calls, “bloc politics along ideological lines and ganging up to form anti-China cliques,” but Beijing’s continued threats only strengthen other countries’ resolve.
The Philippines’ bilateral security arrangements also reflect its frustration over multilateral procedures. Its long-standing ties with ASEAN have not efficiently addressed increasing maritime tensions.
In the aftermath of the Scarborough Shoal standoff in 2012, ASEAN did not produce a joint statement that would have reflected its collective role in regional security.
ASEAN also failed to reinforce the 2016 arbitration ruling filed by the Philippines under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which declared China’s maritime claims and activities to be illegal.
Manila will continue to focus on bilateral defence cooperation with states that have converging security interests.
ASEAN has been unreliable amidst China’s harassment, collisions, and blockade during the Philippines’ resupply missions to the [stranded tank landing ship] BRP Sierra Madre on Second Thomas Shoal.
Meanwhile, progress in the negotiations for a code of conduct between ASEAN and China has been painstakingly slow. The Philippines’ frustration became evident when President Ferdinand Marcos Jr expressed concern that ASEAN could not agree on many things, even, “the definition of a concept as basic as ‘self-restraint’ does not yet enjoy consensus”.
While ASEAN has organised a joint military drill in 2023, it has not yet followed it up with another collective exercise.
As the Philippines calls and waits for multilateral organisation to speak out and do more, it will continue to focus on bilateral defence cooperation with states that have converging security interests. This is especially important as uncertainty clouds its military alliance with the United States under President Donald Trump.
Given his focus on trade tariffs and penchant for transactional diplomacy, Trump may view tensions in the South China Sea as less important in his defence and foreign policy priorities.
The Marcos administration foresees Trump may demand concessions from the Philippines for its security, in the same manner that he wants Taiwan to pay for US protection.
Repetitive affirmations from Washington of an “ironclad commitment” haven’t allayed Manila’s concern. But so long as the Philippines continues to confront maritime threats, it will seek more defence ties with friends.
This story originally appeared on The Interpreter, published by the Lowy Institute for International Policy.
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