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Royal Australian Navy warships HMAS Derwent DE-49, and HMAS Swan DE-50, alongside the US Navy’s nuclear powered cruiser, USS Long Beach in Australia
Guided Missile Cruiser USS Long Beach anchored off Fremantle Western Australia in August 197
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She was the sole member of the Long Beach-class, and the last cruiser built for the United States Navy to a cruiser design; all subsequent cruiser classes were built on scaled-up destroyer hulls (and originally classified as destroyer leaders) or, in the case of the Albany-class, converted from already existing cruisers.[citation needed]
Long Beach was laid down 2 December 1957, launched 14 July 1959 and commissioned 9 September 1961 under the command of then-Captain Eugene Parks Wilkinson, who previously served as the first commanding officer of the world’s first nuclear-powered vessel, the submarine USS Nautilus (SSN-571). She deployed to Vietnam during the Vietnam War and served numerous times in the Western Pacific, Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. By the 1990s, nuclear power was deemed too expensive to use on surface ships smaller than an aircraft carrier in view of defense budget cutbacks after the end of the Cold War. Long Beach was decommissioned on 1 May 1995 instead of receiving her third nuclear refueling and proposed upgrade. After removal of the nuclear fuel, superstructure, and sections of the bow and stern, the hull segment containing the reactor and machinery spaces was moored at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and sold for scrapping.
Configuration
Long Beach was originally intended to be a smaller frigate, but was then redesigned and expanded to a cruiser hull, allowing for an open space just aft of the bridge “box”. This open space was first planned to accommodate the mounting of a Regulus nuclear-armed cruise missile, but was then changed to four launch tubes for the Polaris missile. However, the space was eventually occupied by the 5″/38 caliber gun mounts and the ASROC system.[4] Long Beach was the last cruiser built with a World War II-era cruiser hull style,[5][6] as later new-build cruisers were built with different hull forms, such as the converted frigates Leahy (DLG-16), Bainbridge (DLGN-25), Belknap (DLG-26), Truxtun (DLGN-35), and the California and Virginia classes, or the Ticonderoga-class cruiser that was built on a Spruance-class destroyer hull.[citation needed]
The high box-like superstructure contained the SCANFAR system, consisting of the AN/SPS-32 and AN/SPS-33 phased array radars. One of the reasons Long Beach was a single-ship class was because she was an experimental platform for these radars, which were precursors to the AN/SPY-1 phased array systems later installed on Aegis equipped Ticonderoga-class cruisers and Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. Photos taken at her commissioning and for some time thereafter, show that the taller, narrower AN/SPS-33 panels were not installed on the superstructure until a later date. At the time, Long Beach had the highest bridge of any ship smaller than an aircraft carrier.[citation needed]
Artist’s concept of nuclear powered cruiser design from 1956.
In addition to steel, Long Beach was built with 450 tons of structural aluminum.[7] Because of this unusually high quantity of aluminum, she was assigned the voice radio call sign “Alcoa”.[7] The ship was propelled by two nuclear reactors, one for each propeller shaft, and was capable of speeds in excess of 30 knots (56 km/h). The ship was originally designed with “all-missile” armament, but was fitted with two 5″/38 caliber gun mounts amidships on the orders of President John F. Kennedy.
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USS Holland (SS-1) from Scientific American 1898. The muzzle door of the bow dynamite gun is open.
USS Holland (SS-1) underway
Holland (SS-1) was the United States Navy‘s first modern commissioned submarine, although not the first military submarine of the United States, which was the 1775 submersible Turtle. The boat was originally laid down as Holland VI at the Crescent Shipyard of Elizabeth, New Jersey for John Philip Holland‘s Holland Torpedo Boat Company, and launched on 17 May 1897. She was acquired by the USN on 11 April 1900 and commissioned on 12 October 1900, Lieutenant H. H. Caldwell commanding.[1][2]
Holland was built at former Navy Lieutenant Lewis Nixon’s Crescent Shipyard of Elizabeth, New Jersey for John Holland’s Holland Torpedo Boat Company, which became the Electric Boat company in 1899.[3] The vessel was built under the supervision of John Philip Holland, who designed the vessel and her details. Holland‘s keel was laid at Nixon’s Crescent Shipyard with both men present. The two men worked together using many of John Holland’s proven concepts and patents to make the submarine a reality, each man complementing the other’s contributions to the development of the modern submarine. John Holland was the inventor for US Patent 702,729 for the design of a submarine boat. Testing and training first took place at the Holland Torpedo Boat Station from 1899 to 1900.[4] Important contributions were also made by Arthur L. Busch (or Du Busc), Crescent’s superintendent.
Holland VI included many features that submarines of the early 20th century would exhibit, albeit in later, more advanced forms. There was a conning tower from which the boat and her weapons could be directed. Also, she had all the necessary ballast and trim tanks to make precise changes in depth and attitude underwater. Her crew was six men and maximum diving depth was 75 feet (23 m).[5]
For armament, she had a reloadable 18-inch (450 mm) torpedo tube with three Whitehead Mark 2 torpedoes and an 8.425-inch (214.0 mm) pneumatic dynamite gun in the bow (the dynamite gun’s projectiles were called “aerial torpedoes”).[6] A second dynamite gun in the stern was removed in 1900 to make room for an improved engine exhaust, prior to delivery to the Navy.[7]
She had both an internal combustion engine (specifically, a 4-stroke Otto gasoline engine of 45 bhp (34 kW)) for running on the surface and charging batteries, and an Electro Dynamic electric motor of 50 shp (37 kW) for submerged operation, with one shaft.[8] A 66-cell Exide battery powered the electric motor when submerged.[5] This allowed speeds of 6 knots (11 km/h; 6.9 mph) surfaced and 5.5 knots (10.2 km/h; 6.3 mph) submerged. Surfaced range was 200 nmi (370 km; 230 mi) at 6 kn (11 km/h; 6.9 mph), while submerged range was 30 nmi (56 km; 35 mi) at 5.5 kn (10.2 km/h; 6.3 mph).[5] There is significant variation in references as to the vessel’s horsepower and speed, for example the Register of Ships of the U. S. Navy gives horsepower figures of 45 bhp (34 kW) surfaced and 75 shp (56 kW) submerged, with 8 knots (15 km/h; 9.2 mph) surfaced and 5 knots (9.3 km/h; 5.8 mph) submerged.[6]
Holland VI eventually proved her validity and worthiness as a warship and was ultimately purchased by the U.S. government for the sum of $150,000 on 11 April 1900. She was considered to be the first truly successful craft of her type.[by whom?] The United States Government soon ordered more submarines from Holland’s company, which were to be known as the Plunger class. These became America’s first fleet of underwater naval vessels.
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Holland VI was modified after her christening, and was renamed United States Submarine Torpedo Boat Holland (Submarine-1) when she was commissioned by the US Navy on 12 October 1900, at Newport, Rhode Island, with Lieutenant Harry H. Caldwell in command.[2]
During her commissioned life in the USN, the Holland did not carry the hull designation SS-1. The designation system currently in use was placed into Naval Regulations on 17 July 1920.[9] Thus, the Holland would have never been assigned SS-1. She would have been designated Submarine-1 or simply S-1 under the system in place between 1895 and 1920. Most historians, including official Navy sources,[2] have retroactively applied both the prefix USS and the designation SS-1 to avoid confusion.
Holland was the first commissioned submarine in the US Navy[10] and is the first of the unbroken line of submarines in the Navy. She was the fourth submarine to be owned by the Navy, however. The first submarine was Propeller (also known as Alligator), the second was Intelligent Whale and the third was Plunger, an experimental submarine, built in 1895, which is not to be confused with USS Plunger (SS-2).
On 16 October 1900, in order to be kept serviceable throughout the winter, Holland left Newport under tow of the tug Leyden for Annapolis, Maryland,[10] where she was used to train midshipmen of the United States Naval Academy, as well as officers and enlisted men ordered there to receive training vital in preparing for the operation of other submarines being built for the Fleet.[2]
Holland proved valuable for experimental purposes in collecting data for submarines under construction or contemplation. Her 166 mi (267 km) surface run, from Annapolis to Norfolk, Virginia from 8–10 January 1901, provided useful data on her performance underway over an extended period.[2]
Holland (briefly in 1899, on trials)[7] and five Plunger class Holland-type submarines were based in New Suffolk, New York on the North Fork of Long Island from 1899 to 1905, prompting the hamlet to claim to be the first submarine base in the United States.[11]
Except for the period from 15 June to 1 October 1901, which was passed training cadets at the Naval Torpedo Station, Newport, Rhode Island, Holland remained at Annapolis as a training submarine until 17 July 1905 when she was decommissioned.[2]
Holland finished her career in reserve at Norfolk, Virginia. Her name was struck from the Naval Vessel Register on 21 November 1910.[1] This revolutionary submarine was sold as scrap to Henry A. Hitner & Sons of Philadelphia on 18 June 1913 for $100. Her purchaser was required to put up $5,000 bond as assurance that the submarine would be broken up and not used as a ship.[2]
About 1915, the hulk of the Holland, stripped of her external fittings, was sold to Peter J. Gibbons. As of October 1916 she was on display in Philadelphia.[12] In May 1917 she was moved to the Bronx, New York as a featured attraction at the Bronx International Exposition of Science, Arts and Industries.[13]
Holland was on display for several years in Paterson, New Jersey until she was finally scrapped in 1932
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A General Atomics Mojave Remotely Piloted Air System (RPAS) drone has taken off and safely landed back on board HMS Prince of Wales in the first trial of its kind conducted off the east coast of the United States on 15th November.
The take-off was conducted at an angle across the deck and did not utilise the ramp. The longer-term challenge would be to define the safe operating envelope for the aircraft when loaded with fuel, weapons and sensors and operating in less benign conditions. Recovering an unarrested air vehicle without any form of arrestor gear will present an interesting safety case when there are other aircraft parked on deck.
Mojave is a variant of the MQ1C Gray Eagle which is adapted for short take-off and landing from runways even shorter than the QEC flight deck but is a much larger and more complex aircraft. GA has also developed a wing kit for its SeaGuardian derivative of the MQ-9B similar to the Protector that is just entering RAF service. This includes folding wings and STOL-optimised tail and propellers and maybe a better long-term solution for the RN if it decides to adopt this capability.
Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) Remotely Piloted Air System (RPAS) such as these would offer the carrier a persistent ISR capability and could even be armed. SeaGuardian derivative of the MQ-9B has a range of 6,000nm, is able to stay on station for up to 25 hours and has nine hard-points for a sensor or weapon payload of up to 2,100 kg. SeaGuardian can be equipped with a variety of maritime radar and EO sensors and even conduct ASW when equipped with a sonobuoy dispenser.
The Mojave drone is the largest uncrewed vehicle to have flow from a non-US Navy carrier and many international partners are interested in the results of the trials.
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Akey element of Japan’s planned defence budget spending, currently under strain through a national currency devaluation shock, will be the manufacture of two additional Mogami-class frigates, also known as the Future Frigate Multirole (FFM) platform.
Japan earmarked $50bn for defence in 2023, directing substantial investments towards naval vessels and surface combatant development. Despite economic challenges, Japan’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) has proposed a 17.2% increase in the 2024 defence budget.
According to analysis from GlobalData’s latest report, “Naval Vessels and Surface Combatants Market Size and Trend Analysis by Segments, Programs, Competitive Landscape and Forecast to 2033,” Japan’s Mogami-class procurement programme will account for about 10% of the total spending on frigates segment by countries in Asia-Pacific region over the period 2023-33.
Akash Pratim Debbarma, aerospace and defence analyst at GlobalData, stated: “China’s growing maritime influence over Japanese offshore territories and maritime boundaries poses a major threat to Japan’s strategic interests.
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A photo allegedly showing the Russia’s missile cruiser Moskva, the flagship of its Black Sea fleet, before sinking.
KYIV, Nov 17 (Reuters) – Ukraine‘s military said on Friday its operations had resulted in the destruction of a total of 15 Russian naval vessels in the Black Sea since the start of Russia’s invasion and that 12 other vessels had been damaged.
Ukraine has stepped up its attacks in the Black Sea and on Crimea, which Russia seized and annexed in 2014. Kyiv has reported a series of strikes on warships on and near Crimea this autumn, including a large landing vessel and a submarine.
“You can count the ones that have already been disabled. These are 15 destroyed and 12 damaged ships. Not all of this is the result of drone work, but they also have quite a lot of damaged ships to their credit,” navy spokesperson Dmytro Pletenchuk said in televised comments.
He described Ukraine as “the driver of a new type of naval warfare” that had made Russia move its naval forces to positions more difficult to reach for what Kyiv has in its capacity.
Russia is also suffering logistical problems, he said, due to having to relocate vessels to Novorossiysk and periodically to Tuapse, both ports on the eastern flank of the Black Sea to the southeast of Crimea and further from Ukraine.
Reuters could not independently verify the reports. Russia usually does not acknowledge damage to its military assets and says it repels most Ukrainian attacks.
Ukraine’s military said its operations carried out in the Black Sea so far have included strikes on the Russian Black Sea Navy headquarters in Sevastopol and the shipyard in Kerch, which damaged a vessel that had not yet joined the fleet.
In April 2022, shortly after the start of the war, Ukraine’s forces said it hit the Moskva missile cruiser, flagship of Russia’s Black Sea fleet, with domestically produced a Neptune anti-ship missile. Russia never acknowledged the attack, saying the ship sank following a major fire onboard.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy recently said Kyiv had managed to shift the balance of power in the Black Sea, seizing the initiative from Moscow which regards Crimea as strategically vital to its interests.
(Reporting by Yuliia DysaEditing by Gareth Jones)
(c) Copyright Thomson Reuters 2023.
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As part of the House of Commons Defence Select Committee enquiry into armed forces readiness, the First Sea Lord, Admiral Ben Key gave some insight into the current availability levels of the RN fleet. Here we consider the discussion and some of the nuances and context that were overlooked.
It was asked of the First Sea Lord how many frigates and destroyers could put to sea if called on to “fight tonight”. He was understandably reluctant to be pinned down on exact numbers but stated that “we maintain about 50 per cent of the fleet at high readiness and above” and when pushed, said that there were typically about “eight and a half or nine” escorts at readiness or at sea. It is important to see availability as a constant cycle as ships move through maintenance, training and deployment phases. This cycle is dependent on a long tail of force generation planning to get the vessel to the right material state, provide SQEP (people) along with the spares, stores and equipment needed to make an effective fighting unit. In an emergency greater numbers could be deployed but only with significant consequences in terms of availability in the future. The smaller the fleet becomes, the more acute the effects of any interruption to this cycle.
At the time of this committee hearing, surface combatant availability as a proportion is looking unusually healthy with 9 or 10 of the 17 in commission either at sea or at a high state of readiness. Of course, this peak number can be expected to dip as ships cycle back from deployment. For example, both HMS Dauntless and Duncan have been away for some time and will inevitably need maintenance periods before any of the 3 Type 45s in deep refit are ready to replace them.
Self-congratulation should be avoided as almost everyone agrees that 17 escorts (16 in reality) is woefully inadequate and it was not long ago that Boris Johnson’s government was talking about increasing numbers to 24. While the RN always insists it can meet its mandated tasking under the (classified) Defence Planning Assumptions, there is clearly little depth or resilience to cope with the unexpected or combat losses.
Asked what the First Sea Lord would like to have in an ideal world, the Admiral replied, “What I’d really like is to accelerate the pace of transformation from the ships and submarines we have in build to the new navy…” He compared this new generation of ‘digital ships’ that replace existing ‘analogue vessels’ as being similar to when the RN changed from sail to steam propulsion. This may be rather over-selling the difference between a Type 23 and Type 26/31 but the more important point is that the new ships will have much better availability and greater flexibility for different roles.
Mark Francois MP pointed out that the first Type 26 frigate, HMS Glasgow will have taken 11 years from keel laying to becoming operational in late 2028 which compares very poorly with other navies such as the Japanese. It was implied this delay was all the fault of industry but in fact, the story is rather more complex. The Navy spent almost 30 years deciding what would replace the Type 23 in a convoluted process of changing requirements and a few blind alleys. Years of austerity, the costs of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and aircraft carrier construction, helped push the project further to the right. By the time the Type 26 design was mature enough to begin construction, its price had ballooned and the MoD then spent at least two years in a standoff negotiating on price. The eventual compromise was a slow build schedule agreed by all parties which would spread the cost, keeping in-year payments down, although increasing the total bill. Unfortunately, COVID and production problems added another 18 months of delay.
Putting aside the issues with the first-of-class prototype, HMS Glasgow, 1SL pointed out that of more importance is that the rest of the Type 26s are delivered quicker and in a steady drumbeat, on time and without significant teething troubles. It should be noted that the 5 Batch II vessels will be delivered faster than the first 3 ships. Other than HMS Glasgow the expected In-Service Dates for the Type 26 frigates are not public. (Assuming Babcock can deliver on their promises, the Type 31 in-service schedule is more definite). Dates for the retirement of the Type 23 frigates are also fluid and will depend on their material state. It is doubtful the RN itself can even be sure what its frigate fleet will look like between about 2028-35. The ‘frigate gap’ in this period where the ageing Type 23s have to be kept going awaiting replacement by new ships is undoubtedly the RN’s most pressing medium-term worry.
Following our article published in May highlighting the state of HMS Westminster, the committee pressed 1SL and Rear Admiral Moorhouse on her future. They continue to insist she has not been axed and that a refit might still happen, subject to “ongoing work to understand what would be involved”. The refit would cost at least £100M and might take 3-4 years. It starts to look like wasted money if she can only serve for a few more years from around 2027-32. Transferring her S2087 Towed Array Sonar system to HMS Iron Duke or Argyll (not a simple operation) in the interim might have to be considered. HMS Westminster is highly unlikely to return to the fleet, even if it will entail a further dip in frigate numbers into the early 2030s. A cynic might suggest the RN has been told to stall on the announcement until after the election, by which time it will land on another minister’s in-tray.
Based on our recent article highlighting the concerns about increasingly long deterrent submarine patrols, Sarah Atherton MP asked what can be done to improve matters, especially for submariners. 1SL admitted, “What keeps me awake at night is the pressure on our deployed personnel”. A ‘Tiger Team’ is currently tasked to “think the unthinkable” and look at completely new ways about how submarines are deployed and operated in order to relieve pressure on people.
Mr Francois also quoted our article from late August that noted not a single RN attack submarine was at sea on a particular day, something he described rather unfairly as “operational failure”. 1SL rightly pointed out that this was the best situation for the boats at the time, given their schedules and that maybe they did not actually need to be at sea on that particular day. This is a nuanced argument and 1SL is right to say that submarines are not put to sea for the sake of it and it would be pointlessly disruptive to the operating cycle to do so. (Within a few days, two boats did sail from Faslane as we predicted). When pressed, he suggested that half the force (3 boats) could be put to sea in extremis. He also reminded the committee more broadly that “days at sea” numbers are not a good measurement of fleet effectiveness or actual availability.
However, the episode highlights how a 6-boat force is far too small and 2 of those precious submarines are effectively stuck alongside for an extended period due to maintenance and support infrastructure issues. To say they were “not needed at sea on that day” may be true in a narrow tactical sense but certainly not in the wider strategic sense. It will always be desirable to have one or more boats on operations as they are arguably our most potent naval assets and create great uncertainty in the minds of adversaries. They are also needed to gather intelligence, respond to events, and would be very useful in the Pacific and other theatres if only we had sufficient numbers.
Mr Francois also cited another of our pieces on recruitment issues but the discussion focussed purely on the long term and the pros and cons of the tri-service privatised Armed Forces Recruitment Programme (AFRP). An important opportunity was missed to press the Admiral on the low numbers of candidates making it into basic training right now and what is being done to address this very real crisis. Everyone recognises that in the long term militaries around the world will struggle to find recruits for a variety of demographic and societal factors, however, the RN does not have an attraction problem at present. According to the MoD’s own figures, at least 80 people apply to join the RN every single day but failures in the processing pipeline mean many suitable candidates don’t make it to HMS Raleigh.
On the sustainment of the fleet in theatre, the witnesses pointed out that the RN can be positive about the progress with the Type 45 PIP programme and the success of forward-deploying a frigate, MCMVs in the Gulf and the Batch II OPVs overseas. The RN was one of the few navies that was able to send a carrier strike group across the globe during COVID with very little host nation support.
Finally, it should be noted that Ben Key and Steve Moorhouse are generally well-liked and respected in the service and are grappling hard with an array of legacy problems, few of which are of their making. They are obviously constrained by what they can say in the committee but mostly endeavoured to be honest and avoid the spin and obscurification that is sometimes the refuge of other uniformed and MoD witnesses.
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The General Dynamics factory near Merthyr Tydfil in the heart of the Welsh Valleys is where all six variants of the Ajax, the British Army’s advanced land vehicle system, are being built.
Ajax is designed to be at the heart of the Army’s future armoured fleet, and 589 vehicles from the Ajax family are being built at this site.
Forces News has been given special permission to go on the factory floor to see how these highly capable vehicles are being constructed.
Jonathan Richards, head of production at the plant, told Forces News: “At any one time, when we are at full rate production there will be circa 50 vehicles on the shop floor that are either in production or test itself.”
In what is something of a first for this industry, the end user – the Army – is at the factory right through the process.
“You have Army personnel on site permanently and indeed they work collaboratively with the GD [General Dynamics] team to get the best result on the JAG, joint acceptance group testing,” Mr Richards added.
This means each of the Ajax variants – Ajax, Ares, Argus, Athena, Atlas and Apollo – leaves the site with both builder and user approval, in turn speeding everything up.
Also more efficient is the build process itself.
There is a production line system, just like with cars, rather than building each vehicle from scratch in its own bay, which is time-consuming but had been the norm in sections of defence manufacturing.
Many of those building Ajax are themselves military veterans and know the importance of what they are doing.
Production line manager Darren Liversage, who is ex-military, said: “I’m extremely proud, it’s very rewarding, I know where the end user is going to be using it, how it’s going to be used and the environments it’s going to be used in.”
He added: “I appreciate the quality of the builds we are producing and knowing that we are going to be saving lives with the vehicle.”
Mr Liversage believes the Ajax is “head over heels, higher than any of the current vehicles that are out there”, simply calling it “brilliant”.
The people at the sharp end of building the new armoured vehicle know full well that their hard work will pay dividends for generations of soldiers to come.
Platforms will continue to be delivered to the Army in 2023, with the Household Cavalry and 6th Battalion Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers being the first to convert to Ajax.
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The Australian federal government has welcomed a new United States-funded fuel facility completed at RAAF Base Darwin, as a significant milestone in the partnership between Australia and the US.
Valued at US$76 million, the fuel storage project was managed by the United States Naval Facilities Engineering Systems Command Pacific with the construction contract awarded to Nova Nacap JV, a United States–Australian joint venture. Construction was completed in June 2023.
The newly completed fuel facility is designed to enhance operational capabilities and support for training exercises to enable enhanced air cooperation between the countries and is a significant investment under the United States Force Posture Initiatives (USFPI) infrastructure program.
Australian businesses and joint ventures have won four of the five US-funded contracts for capital infrastructure delivery under the Force Posture Agreement, representing approximately US$198 million of United States investment since the start of the USFPI.
Celia Perkins, Deputy Secretary Security and Estate, said Australia and the United States are investing in a range of projects to enable enhanced force posture cooperation, with significant opportunities for Australian industry involvement across sectors including construction, professional services, maintenance, and logistics.
“Defence has engaged extensively with the United States on this project ensuring we have the enablers in place to best support activities under the Force Posture Agreement,” Perkins said.
“Infrastructure to support USPFI is located across the Defence estate, including at Robertson Barracks and RAAF Bases Darwin and Tindal, as well as training areas across the Northern Territory.”
The Enhanced Air Cooperation (EAC) was originally announced as an initiative in February 2017. The program, designed to deepen air-to-air integration, includes activities relating to integration of advanced and combined warfighting capabilities, collaborative airbase operations and combat support, cooperation with air-power enabling capabilities, collaborative logistics supporting airpower, and bilateral regional engagement.
EAC provides opportunities to enhance Australia and US engagement with regional partner air forces through involvement in exercises and training activities.
The project also aligns with the Government’s response to the Defence Strategic Review to increase preparedness, invest in our northern infrastructure network, and deliver resilient fuel solutions.
Earlier this year, the Defence Strategic Review (DSR), unveiled on Monday, 24 April, recommended the Australian Army would be optimised for long-range strike capability and littoral operations in northern land and maritime spaces, while the Royal Australian Air Force would support operations in the north through surveillance, air defence, strike, and air transport.
The Australian Defence Force’s ability to operate from Australia’s northern bases was identified as a key priority area under the DSR recommendations,
The report recommended major works on northern air bases including improvements to runway and apron capacity, fuel supply and storage, accommodation and security.
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